Regulation S-K Item 402(S): Regulating Compensation Incentive-Based Risk through Mandatory Disclosure by Higgins, Danielle Angott
Case Western Reserve Law Review
Volume 61 | Issue 3
2011
Regulation S-K Item 402(S): Regulating
Compensation Incentive-Based Risk through
Mandatory Disclosure
Danielle Angott Higgins
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/caselrev
Part of the Law Commons
This Comments is brought to you for free and open access by the Student Journals at Case Western Reserve University School of Law Scholarly
Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Case Western Reserve Law Review by an authorized administrator of Case Western Reserve University
School of Law Scholarly Commons.
Recommended Citation
Danielle Angott Higgins, Regulation S-K Item 402(S): Regulating Compensation Incentive-Based Risk through Mandatory Disclosure, 61
Case W. Res. L. Rev. 1049 (2011)
Available at: https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/caselrev/vol61/iss3/9




REGULATION S-K ITEM 402(S): 
REGULATING COMPENSATION 
INCENTIVE-BASED RISK THROUGH 
MANDATORY DISCLOSURE 
“Sunlight is said to be the best of disinfectants; 
 electric light the most efficient policeman.”1 
 
It is axiomatic that transparency underlies the United States capital 
markets and the entire public company mandatory disclosure 
scheme.2 Periodic reports and public offering registration documents 
are intended to provide potential investors and current shareholders 
with the information necessary to make informed decisions whether 
to buy, sell, or hold securities.3 Disclosure of such extensive 
information comes at a price—periodic disclosure documents can 
reach several hundred pages, costing companies and their 
management and directors, significant expense and time.4 The federal 
securities laws’ focus on disclosure, transparency, and informed 
investor choice are not only important tools against investment fraud 
but are also thought to be important deterrents to other undesirable 
corporate conduct and decision making.5 Yet, it seems that no matter 
                                                                                                                 
1 LOUIS D. BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE’S MONEY AND HOW THE BANKERS USE IT 92 
(1914). 
2 See, e.g., Louis Lowenstein, Financial Transparency and Corporate Governance: You 
Manage What You Measure, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 1335, 1341 (1996) (discussing how market 
transparency and disclosure requirements are unique and essential to the American markets). 
3 See Joel Seligman, No One Can Serve Two Masters: Corporate and Securities Law 
After Enron, 80 WASH. U. L. Q. 449, 450 (2002) (“At its core, the primary policy of the federal 
securities laws involves the remediation of information asymmetries, that is, equalization of the 
information available to outside investors and insiders.”). 
4 See James Pethokoukis, Annual Report, R.I.P., THE AMERICAN: THE JOURNAL OF THE 
AMERICAN ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE, (Jan./Feb. 2008), http://www.american.com/archive/2008/ 
january-february-magazine-contents/annual-report-r-i-p (describing post-Sarbanes-Oxley annual 
reports as huge, undecipherable “data dumps”); Arthur J. Radin, Have We Created Financial 
Statement Disclosure Overload?, THE CPA JOURNAL ONLINE, (Nov. 2007), http://www. 
nysscpa.org/cpajournal/2007/1107/perspectives/p6.htm (noting that a sampling of 10-K annual 
disclosure reports average 150 pages). 
5 See Seligman, supra note 3, at 449–50 (discussing the harm done to investors when 
corporations act without making proper disclosures to shareholders, which was the 
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how much information is currently disclosed, with each new financial 
or corporate scandal, even more disclosure is compelled in response.6 
It is no surprise, then, that disclosure requirements have grown as a 
result of the 2008 collapse of Bear Stearns and Lehman Brothers.   
The unprecedented collapse of two of Wall Street’s most 
longstanding and prominent investment banks sparked the worst 
phase of the most recent “scandal,” or more aptly, “Financial Crisis.”7 
The sophisticated and risky financial products that generated billions 
of dollars in profit for the financial services industry during the 
preceding years, culminated with dramatic and devastating effects.8 
To prevent a global economic collapse, the federal government 
injected nearly $250 billion into the financial sector by purchasing 
assets and equity from troubled financial institutions via the Troubled 
Asset Relief Program (“TARP”).9 From its inception, TARP 
                                                                                                                 
 
government’s impetus for creating the Securities and Exchange Commission and passing the 
Securities Exchange Acts of 1933 and 1934). 
6 The foundational securities laws, under which corporate disclosure originated, were 
enacted under the New Deal Congress in response to widespread securities fraud. See Securities 
Act of 1933, Pub. L. No. 105-353, 48 Stat. 73 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 77d, 77g, 
77h(b), 77j (2006)) (defining disclosure responsibilities attendant to company’s sale of 
securities); Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 105-366, 48 Stat. 881 (codified as 
amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m, 78n (2006)) (prescribing mandatory periodic reporting, proxy 
related, and tender-offer related reporting for entities with publicly traded securities and certain 
others), amended by Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 
111–203, 124 Stat. 1797 (2010). Recently, the sweeping reform of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 
2002 mandated further disclosure in response to the Enron and WorldCom accounting scandals. 
See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107–204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified at 15 U.S.C. 
§§ 7201-66 (2006)).  
7 See, e.g., WILLIAM D. COHAN, HOUSE OF CARDS: A TALE OF HUBRIS AND WRETCHED 
EXCESS ON WALL STREET (2009) (chronicling the fall of Bear Stearns); LARRY ELLIOTT & DAN 
ATKINSON, THE GODS THAT FAILED: HOW BLIND FAITH IN MARKETS HAS COST US OUR 
FUTURE (2009) (discussing the failure of Bear Stearns and Northern Rocky); GEORGE SOROS, 
THE CRASH OF 2008 AND WHAT IT MEANS: THE NEW PARADIGM FOR FINANCIAL MARKETS (2d 
ed. 2009) (analyzing the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers and the origins of the 2008 financial 
crisis). 
8 The casualties included two of Wall Street’s oldest and most preeminent investment 
banks—Bear Stearns and Lehman Brothers—while many other financial firms hung on by a 
thread. See Robin Sidel et al., The Week That Shook Wall Street: Inside the Demise of Bear 
Stearns, WALL ST. J., Mar. 18, 2008, at A1 (detailing the fall of Bear Stearns). 
9 Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110–343, § 2(1), 122 Stat. 
3765, 3766 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5201)); see also OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL INSPECTOR 
GEN. FOR THE TROUBLED ASSET RELIEF PROGRAM, QUARTERLY REPORT TO CONGRESS 3 (July 
21, 2009), available at http://www.sigtarp.gov/reports/congress/2009/July2009_Quarterly_ 
Report_to_Congress.pdf (summarizing the execution and effect of the Troubled Asset Relief 
Program). For a more exacting analysis of TARP and its implications see J.W. Verret, Treasury 
Inc.: How the Bailout Reshapes Corporate Theory and Practice, 27 YALE J. ON REG. 283 
(2010) (analyzing TARP under several prominent theories of corporate law and predicting how 
the Treasury Department’s stock ownership will reshape corporate law) and Barbara Black, The 
U.S. as “Reluctant Shareholder”: Government, Business and the Law, 5 ENTREPRENEURIAL 
BUS. L.J. 561 (2010) (examining the government’s actions as a shareholder in five major U.S. 
companies). 
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generated significant controversy and numerous critics.10 However, 
when insurance behemoth American International Group (AIG) 
released compensation data for its failed derivatives trading group—
including substantial bonuses funded by federal TARP assistance—
public outrage over executive compensation practices came to a 
derisive head.11 
Policymakers, commentators, and business executives have all 
offered various, and in many cases, competing theories outlining the 
“causes” of the Financial Crisis.12 Conventional wisdom claims that 
“perverse” compensation bonus incentives paid to individual bankers 
are to blame in large part.13 Others believe the banks themselves 
disregarded risk because they were engaged in a figurative “arms 
race” amongst each other, competing to amass the largest profits for 
their respective organizations and, consequently, paying their 
employees the largest bonuses.14 But others contend that the empirical 
evidence linking incentive-based compensation and excessive risk 
taking is lacking, and maintain that the bankers simply lacked 
foresight and were ignorant of the substantial risks inherent in the 
various transactions in which they were engaged.15 
                                                                                                                 
10 See Michael R. Crittenden, Panel Steps Up Criticism of Treasury Over TARP, WALL 
ST. J., Jan. 9, 2009, at A3 (discussing “scathing criticism” of TARP by five-member 
congressional oversight panel). 
11 See, e.g., Edmund L. Andrews & Peter Baker, At A.I.G., Huge Bonuses After $170 
Billion Bailout, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 15, 2009, at A1 (“Word of the bonuses . . . stirred such deep 
consternation inside the Obama administration that Treasury Secretary Timothy F. Geithner told 
the firm they were unacceptable and demanded they be renegotiated . . . .”); Edmund L. 
Andrews & Peter Baker, Bonus Money at Troubled A.I.G. Draws Heavy Criticism, N.Y. TIMES, 
Mar. 16, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/03/16/business/16aig.html (noting that both the 
Obama administration and Republicans universally condemned the A.I.G. bonuses). 
12 For a detailed analysis of the financial crisis, its causes, and the subsequent bailouts, see 
Steven L. Schwarcz, Protecting Financial Markets: Lessons from the Subprime Mortgage 
Meltdown, 93 MINN. L. REV. 373, 376 (2008) (“[M]ost of the causes . . . can be attributed to 
conflicts of interest, investor complacency, and overall complexity, all exacerbated by 
cupidity.”). 
13 See Lucian A. Bebchuk & Holger Spamann, Regulating Bankers’ Pay, 98 GEO. L.J. 
247, 247 (2010) (arguing that bank executive compensation packages insulate their recipients 
from company losses and lead executives to insufficiently weigh investment risks); Claire Hill 
& Richard Painter, Berle’s Vision Beyond Shareholder Interests: Why Investment Bankers 
Should Have (Some) Personal Liability, 33 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1173, 1173 (2010) (arguing that 
stock based executive compensation caused managers to take excessive risks that inflicted 
damage on creditors and society); Fredrick Tung, Pay for Banker Performance: Structuring 
Executive Compensation for Risk Regulation (Emory Public Law, Research Paper 10-93, 2010), 
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1546229 (“[E]quity compensation tends to induce greater 
risk taking by aligning managers’ risk preferences with those of equity holders.”). 
14 See Ing-Haw Cheng et al., Yesterday’s Heroes: Compensation and Creative Risk-
Taking (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 16176, 2010), available at 
http://www.nber.org/papers/w16176.pdf (analyzing the correlation between residual bonuses 
and executive risk taking). 
15 Rüdiger Fahlenbrach & René M. Stulz, Bank CEO Incentives and the Credit Crisis 18 
(Charles A. Dice Ctr. For Research in Fin. Econ., Working Paper No. 2009-13, 2010), available 
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Nevertheless, the notion of “excessive” or “imprudent” risk taking 
emerges as a common thread in the various articulations.16 
Interestingly, and perhaps intuitively, most commentators and 
legislators have almost myopically associated excessive or imprudent 
risk taking with “excessive” or “perverse” executive compensation 
arrangements.17 Indeed the public is led to believe that short-term 
incentive-based bonus compensation constitutes a significant, and 
arguably obscene, portion of the total compensation awarded to many 
business executives and employees because huge bonus payouts make 
the news.18  
Indeed, Congress viewed risk management and mitigation as focal 
points in the recent Dodd-Frank legislation.19 Further, the Securities 
Exchange Commission (“SEC”) recently released new Regulation S-
K disclosure enhancements aimed at increasing internal risk-
management, and requiring disclosure where incentive-based 
compensation is likely to result in imprudent risk taking that is 
damaging to the corporation.20 The new requirements largely focus on 
                                                                                                                 
 
at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1439859 (“[O]ur results cannot be explained by the large share 
ownership of some CEOs of investment banks that performed poorly.”); Floyd Norris, It May be 
Outrageous, but Wall Street Pay Didn’t Cause This Crisis, N.Y. TIMES, July 31, 2009, at B1 
(“[T]here is little evidence that big pay – or the incentives connected to it – caused the financial 
train wreck that sent the world into recession . . . . To the contrary, there is plenty of evidence 
that no one who counted – traders, chief executives or regulators – understood the risks that 
were being taken.”). 
16 See generally Bebchuk & Spamann, supra note 13 (arguing that executive 
compensation packages lead executives to insufficiently weigh investment risks); Tung, supra 
note 13 (arguing that stock based executive compensation plans may have caused executives to 
engage in excessive risk taking). 
17 See supra note 13 and accompanying text. 
18 See Aaron Lucchetti, Wall Street Expects 5% Bonus Rise, WALL ST. J., Nov. 4, 2010 at 
C2 (noting that although hedge fund and private equity bonus compensation is set to rise, stock 
and bond traders should expect a 20–30% decline in bonus for 2010 based on poor earnings). 
19 See, e.g., Executive Compensation Oversight After the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform 
and Consumer Protection Act: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Financial Services, 111th 
Cong. 6–8 (2010) (statement of Scott G. Alvarez, General Counsel, Board of Governors of the 
Federal Reserve System) (describing the guidance adopted by the Federal Reserve); see also id. 
60–69 (statement of Meredith Cross, Director, Division of Corporate Finance, Securities and 
Exchange Commission ) (describing new SEC rules addressing executive compensation). 
20 Proxy Disclosure Enhancements, 74 Fed. Reg. 68334 (Dec. 23, 2009) (to be codified at 
17 C.F.R. pts. 229, 239, 240, 249, 274). Recent financial and corporate reforms focus on 
providing shareholders with greater disclosure of how banks and other publically traded 
corporations compensate executives, manage and mitigate imprudent risk taking, while 
concurrently giving shareholders a “say” on these issues. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform 
and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. 111-203, § 951, 124 Stat. 1376, 1899-900 (2010) 
(requiring public companies to include a non-binding resolution subject to shareholder vote in 
their proxy materials approving executive compensation); id. §§ 953, 955, 124 Stat. at 1903-05 
(requiring further disclosure of executive compensation arrangements in proxy statements); id. § 
954, 124 Stat. at 1904 (expanding the scope of “clawback” of certain executive payments that 
were based on improper financial statements); id. § 956, 124 Stat. at 1905-06 (requiring federal 
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disclosure, but fail to provide meaningful guidance on how reporting 
companies are to gauge risk or can delineate productive prudent risk 
taking from excessive risk taking.21 Nevertheless, companies are 
required to evaluate and disclose how their compensation schemes 
may encourage imprudent risk-taking behavior. In light of these 
considerations, this Comment first attempts to succinctly explore the 
SEC’s intent in implementing the disclosure enhancements and 
delineate the likely intended scope of disclosure. Second, this 
Comment suggests that firms consider adopting various mitigation 
and deferment mechanisms to limit their exposure to potential 
liability stemming from disclosure requirements, and to encourage 
prudent risk taking in compliance with internal risk-management 
policies. These recommendations will be analyzed in light of 
traditional theories of executive-compensation and corporate-reform 
requirements. 
This Comment proceeds in two Parts. The first Part describes how 
compensation practices may theoretically incentivize employees to 
take imprudent risks or create adverse risk in general, focusing on 
potential agency issues inherent in the shareholder-manager 
relationship. The second Part explores the scope of Regulation S-K 
Item 402(s), which requires public companies to disclose 
compensation risk that is reasonably likely to have a materially 
adverse effect, from the perspectives of both the SEC and subject 
companies. 
I. BRIEF OVERVIEW OF EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION  
IN THE UNITED STATES 
Executive compensation in the United States has long been 
considered a problematic corporate governance issue.22 It has 
generated even further attention and condemnation over the past few 
decades given the seemingly exponential growth of executive 
                                                                                                                 
 
regulators to issue guidelines mandating the disclosure of incentive-based compensation that 
encourages inappropriate risks at banking holding companies, registered broker-deals, and other 
investment firms); id. § 952, 124 Stat. at 1900 (requiring compensation committee 
independence). 
21 See Karl S. Okamoto & Douglas O. Edwards, Risk Taking, 32 CARDOZO L. REV. 159, 
159–60 (2010) (arguing that current regulatory attempts to curb excessive risk taking fail to 
provide an account of “optimal risk taking”). 
22 See George T. Washington, The Corporation Executive’s Living Wage, 54 HARV. L. 
REV. 733, 733 (1941) (discussing excessive executive compensation as a source of employee 
and shareholder dissatisfaction); see also JOEL SELIGMAN, THE TRANSFORMATION OF WALL 
STREET: A HISTORY OF THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION AND MODERN 
CORPORATE FINANCE 25–26 (3d ed. 2003) (noting that excessive compensation was a crucial 
justification for federal securities regulation in the 1930s).  
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compensation packages in relation to the “average” employee wage.23 
Whether the dollar figure awarded to executives is patently 
reasonable or excessive is beyond the scope of this Comment. Rather, 
this Comment is concerned with the extent to which compensation 
practices may be tied to imprudent risk taking, and how companies 
should handle this situation in light of Item 402(s) disclosure 
requirements.24  
A for-profit corporation’s primary objective is to “conduct . . . 
business activities with a view to enhancing corporate profit and 
shareholder gain.”25 Specifically, maximization of long-term, as 
opposed to short-term, shareholder gain is fundamental.26 In all 
business dealings, however, elements of uncertainty and risk exist as 
potential impediments to the realization of profit.27 Prudent 
corporations must therefore evaluate the risk/reward attributes of 
corporate actions to determine those most likely to achieve optimal 
results. The question then becomes: who makes this assessment?  
A corporation’s stakeholders typically exercise very little direct 
control over the direction and management of the corporation, 
particularly in the case of large, publicly traded corporations.28 That 
task is left to corporate boards of directors, who in turn delegate 
                                                                                                                 
23 See Kevin J. Murphy, Explaining Executive Compensation: Managerial Power Versus 
the Perceived Cost of Stock Options, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 847, 847 (2002) (noting that among 
CEO compensation in S&P 500 companies from 1992 through 200, “median total compensation 
nearly tripled from $2.3 million in 1992 to over $6.5 million in 2000”); Jeffery Moriarty, How 
Much Compensation Can CEOs Permissibly Accept?, 19 BUS. ETHICS Q. 235, 235 (2009) 
(noting that CEO compensation is 314 times the $32,142 earned by the median full-time private 
industry worker in the U.S. in 2006). 
24 Although specific dollar figures are not the focus of this paper, it should be noted that 
incentive-based compensation typically constitutes a substantial portion of executive 
compensation packages, particularly within the financial services industry where these particular 
issues are most likely to arise. See e.g., Louise Story, Executive Pay, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 20, 
2010, available at http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/subjects/e/executive_pay/ 
index.html?scp=1&sq=executive%20compensation%20and%20risk%20&st=cse (noting that 
executive compensation funds began to soar in the 1980s and 1990s).  
25 1 THE AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: 
ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS § 2.01(a) (1992). But see David P. Porter, Institutional 
Investors and Their Role in Corporate Governance: Reflections by a “Recovering” Corporate 
Governance Lawyer, 59 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 627, 639–40 (2009) (discussing alternative 
theories of corporations such as social responsibility). 
26 See THE AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, supra note 25, at cmt. f (“[T]hat the objective of 
the corporation is to conduct business activities with a view to enhancing corporate profit and 
shareholder gain [] does not mean that the objective of the corporation must be to realize 
corporate profit and shareholder gain in the short run. Indeed, the contrary is true: long-run 
profitability and shareholder gain are at the core of the economic objective.”). 
27 FRANK H. KNIGHT, RISK, UNCERTAINTY AND PROFIT (8th ed. 1957) (explaining why 
risk and uncertainty does not give rise to profits). 
28 See Eugene F. Fama & Michael C. Jensen, Separation of Ownership and Control, 26 
J.L. & ECON. 301, 313 (1983) (discussing the delegation of internal control of a public 
corporation to a board of directors). 
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responsibility to executive officers, who run the day-to-day operations 
of the corporation.29 But achievement of the long-term profit 
objective may be compromised where corporate executives and their 
employees make business decisions while receiving a fixed salary and 
bearing little “risk.” In the meantime, “those who take the risk and 
receive profits—the stockholders—make no decisions, exercise no 
control.”30 In response to this conundrum, boards often structure 
compensation packages to award executives with incentive-based 
bonuses or equity awards, based on the achievement of a particular 
target or benchmark.31 
Scholars are sharply divided on the question of whether incentive-
based compensation provides executives with perverse incentives to 
take imprudent risks at their company’s expense. Professors Lucian 
Bebchuk and Jesse Fried have extensively studied the various forms 
of CEO compensation and ultimately conclude that the so-called 
“pay-for-performance” incentive-based payments have failed to 
deliver on their promise.32 They articulate two primary criticisms of 
traditional corporate governance of executive compensation 
arrangements. First, in the executive compensation context, an 
inherent conflict of interest in the agency relationship exists, at least 
in theory, between shareholders and management.33 Second, the 
                                                                                                                 
29 Id. 
30 KNIGHT, supra note 27, at 203 (“There is an apparent separation of the functions of 
making decisions and taking the ‘risk’ of error in decisions.”). 
31 LUCIAN BEBCHUK & JESSE FRIED, PAY WITHOUT PERFORMANCE: THE UNFULFILLED 
PROMISE OF EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION 15 (2004) (describing the design of executive 
compensation as protecting shareholder interests). 
32 See, e.g., id. (describing significant flaws in corporate governance and executive 
compensation packages and suggesting that they must fundamentally change if companies are to 
be managed in a manner that promotes shareholders’ interests); Lucian Arye Bebcuck & Jesse 
M. Fried, Executive Compensation as an Agency Problem, 17 J. ECON. PERSP. 71, 72 (2003) 
(explaining that substantial costs are imposed on shareholders when managers have influence 
over their own pay); Lucian A. Bebchuk et al., Managerial Power and Rent Extraction in the 
Design of Executive Compensation, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 751, 751 (2002) (describing executive 
compensation as rent extraction, which produce “suboptimal incentives” and ultimately hurts 
shareholder value in a company); Lucian A. Bebchuk & Jesse M. Fried, Pay Without 
Performance: Overview of the Issues, 17 J. APPLIED CORP. FIN. 8 (2005) (discussing how 
executive compensation in the United States has strayed from the model upon which it was 
built, arm’s-length negotiation). But see Patrick Bolton et al., Executive Compensation and 
Short-Termist Behaviour in Speculative Markets, 73 REV. OF ECON. STUDIES 577, 577 (2006) 
(arguing that, in a speculative market where stock prices may deviate from fundamentals, an 
emphasis on short-term stock performance may be the outcome of an optimal contracting 
problem rather than rent extraction by managers). 
33 See BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 31, at 15–16. To mitigate the inherent tension 
between agents and principals, corporate law requires firms to elect boards of directors, who in 
turn, are required to act in the best interest of the shareholders. State law governs the 
relationship between directors and shareholders by imposing a fiduciary duty of good faith and 
loyalty on directors to act in the best interest of the corporation’s shareholders. See, e.g., Smith 
v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 881 (Del. 1985) (holding that the board of directors of Trans 
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notion that boards represent shareholders’ interests by negotiating 
compensation arrangements at arm’s length with management may be 
flawed if boards are not truly independent.34 
Bebchuk and Fried argue that current compensation packages are 
often overly favorable to management because directors are reluctant 
to seriously negotiate and hold executives accountable for their 
performance.35 Additionally, they suggest that incentive-based 
schemes may provide perverse incentives for executives to maximize 
current compensation by taking short-term hyper-risks while ignoring 
serious long-term systemic risks.36 This argument is easy to 
understand when compensation packages are overly weighted toward 
short-term, rather than long-term, payouts, especially in industries 
where frequent lateral employment moves are common. It seems 
obvious that an employee who does not plan to stay at the current 
                                                                                                                 
 
Union Corp. breached their fiduciary duty to Trans Union shareholders and were grossly 
negligent by failing to make an informed business decision regarding a cash-out merger and 
failing to disclose material facts regarding the merger to shareholders), superseded by statute, 
DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 8, § 102 (2001), as recognized in Emerald Partners v. Berlin, 787 A.2d 85, 
90 (Del. 2001); Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 179 (Del. 
1986) (stating that duty of directors when company is being sold is to maximize company’s 
value for shareholders). Notably, the business judgment rule limits the extent of directors’ 
fiduciary duty to shareholders in disinterested transactions. See, e.g., Unocal Corp. v. Mesa 
Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 954 (Del. 1985) (holding that board will enjoy protection of 
business judgment rule, in suits challenging propriety of its takeover defenses, where directors 
demonstrate their good faith, reasonable investigation and proportionality of defenses against 
perceived harm to corporation).  
34 BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 31, at 23–44 (describing the design of executive 
compensation structures). Generally, the director-primacy model underlies traditional corporate 
law’s approach to executive compensation. See Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy: The 
Means and Ends of Corporate Governance, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 547 (2003) (exploring the 
benefits and implications of the director-primacy model across the spectrum of corporate law). 
At its core, the director-primacy model assumes that boards, bargaining at arm’s length with 
corporate executives, negotiate pay arrangements designed to serve shareholders’ interest. See 
id. at 562 (noting the recent trend of paying directors in stock, which serves to align director and 
shareholder interests). Additionally, national stock exchange listing requirements mandate that 
“independent” directors must constitute a majority on the boards of listed companies. 
NASDAQ, LISTING STANDARDS & FEES 22 (2010), available at http://www.nasdaq.com/about/ 
nasdaq_listing_req_fees.pdf. Accordingly, it can be assumed that when Bebchuk discusses a 
lack of director independence, he does so figuratively (i.e. social relationships between 
independent directors and management as influencing director objectivity) rather than literally 
(i.e. directors are all insiders or affiliates). 
35 Theoretically, the widely accepted director-primacy model serves to mitigate the 
agency problem because independent directors constitute a majority of boards, and it is assumed 
that independent directors negotiate executive compensation at arm’s length with management. 
See BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 31, at 17 (describing the corporate theory of arm’s-length 
negotiating between directors and executives for executive compensation). Bebchuk and Fried’s 
“managerial power” critique contends that a structural bias among those who comprise boards 
of directors and managements of corporations prohibits arm’s length bargaining. Id. at 61–79.  
36 See Lucian A. Bebchuk, How to Fix Bankers’ Pay, 139 DAEDALUS 52, 53 (2010) 
(suggesting that executives’ ability to garner large amounts of compensation based on short-
term results induces them to take excessive risk). 
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employer for the long term will be motivated to maximize her short-
term reward, without regard for the long-term consequences. By the 
time the unfortunate results occur, the employee will have cashed out 
and moved on, often to an even more lucrative position. 
The critical debate over whether short-term compensation bonus 
incentives actually incentivized banking executives to engage in 
hyper-risky transactions, or whether ignorance or underestimation of 
the risk alone is to blame, however, is more contentious than Bebchuk 
and Fried’s general conclusions.37 Proponents of the latter theory 
suggest that compensation incentives were irrelevant to the 
discussion, as executives at Lehman Brothers and Bear Stearns 
maintained outstanding stock and options that were not cashed in 
before the Financial Crisis.38 Even assuming that executives did not 
knowingly engage in short-term risk-taking compensation 
arrangements that award executives handsomely for short-term profit, 
their compensation arrangements may nonetheless have discouraged 
them from appropriately gauging long-term risk.39 At the systemic 
level, however, it is arguably less likely that compensation bonus 
                                                                                                                 
37 Compare William D. Cohan, Make Wall Street Risk It All, N.Y. TIMES ONLINE (Oct. 7, 
2010, 8:40 PM), http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/10/07/make-wall-street-risk-it-
all/?scp=4&sq=excessive%20risk-taking%20financial%20crisis&st=cse (“We already have 
definitive proof that Wall Street’s compensation practices lead to excessive risk-taking: witness 
the way Wall Street’s armies kept selling mortgage-based securities filled with defaulting home 
mortgages long after the securities made any sense as an investment. Wall Street did the same 
thing in the 1980s with junk bonds, the same thing in the 1990s with Internet initial public 
offerings, and the same thing in the in the early 2000s with the debt of emerging 
telecommunications companies.”), with Ira T. Kay, CEO Pay for Performance: The Solution to 
“Managerial Power,” 30 J. CORP. L. 785 (2005) (arguing that the current pay model is not 
broken, but agrees that more long-term vesting equity awards are preferable). 
38 See Floyd Norris, It May Be Outrageous, But Wall Street Pay Didn’t Cause this Crisis, 
N.Y. TIMES, July 31, 2009, at B1 (noting that most bank CEOs lost millions of dollars in share 
value in the 2008 financial crisis and did not sell their shares to avoid losses); Jeffrey Friedman, 
Op-Ed., Bank Pay and the Financial Crisis, WALL ST. J. ONLINE (September 28, 2009, 10:27 
AM), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970204488304574429293838639418.html 
?KEYWORDS=%22jeffrey+friedman%22 (relying on the Lehman CEOs’ large paper losses as 
a basis for his view that financial firm compensation structure was not at fault for bank’s risk-
taking). Empirical evidence demonstrates, however, that in the years prior to the Wall Street 
crash, executives of these firms earned substantially more through short-term bonus incentives 
and cashed-in options and stock than they lost during the crash. See Lucian A. Bebchuk et. al, 
The Wages of Failure: Executive Compensation at Bear Stearns and Lehman 2000-2008, 27 
YALE J. ON REG. 257, 257 (“[T]he top executive teams of Bear Stearns and Lehman Brothers 
derived cash flows of about $1.4 billion and $1 billion, respectively, from cash bonuses and 
equity sales during 2000-2008.”). 
39 See Miriam A. Cherry & Jarrod Wong, Clawbacks: Prospective Contract Measures in 
an Era of Excessive Executive Compensation and Ponzi Schemes, 94 MINN. L. REV. 368, 392 
(2009) (“One of the major problems with executive compensation has been a focus only upon 
short-term performance. Such short-term thinking often leads to opportunistic behavior, at the 
expense of the long-term health of the company. By in a sense operating as a ‘lead parachute,’ 
prospective clawback provisions begin to align incentives over a longer time frame.”). 
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incentives were the sole motivating factor behind the Financial 
Crisis.40  
A recent study, for example, found that the financial services 
industry had “some of the longest vesting schedules in their executive 
pay contracts” of any industry reviewed.41 Thus, while conventional 
wisdom believes that short-term incentives are to blame for the 
Financial Crisis, notably little empirical evidence in support of that 
notion exists, while evidence to the contrary continues to mount.42 
Interestingly, an emerging minority of scholars and critics are 
offering empirical evidence debunking the mainstream notion that 
incentive-based compensation encourages imprudent risk taking.43 If 
these scholars are correct, the exhaustive focus on risk and 
compensation may be misplaced and the practical effect of Item 
402(s) may be slight. 
Currently, however, the majority’s view pervades the media and 
has garnered the support of the public and policymakers.44 Within the 
last decade alone, egregious examples of executives acting 
opportunistically to maximize personal gain at the expense of their 
corporations produced significant media attention and have served as 
the basis for significant corporate financial reform.45 The Enron and 
WorldCom accounting scandals both serve as extreme examples of 
self-serving, opportunistic, and fraudulent behavior by executives to 
maximize their personal gains at the expense of the corporation and 
shareholders.46  
                                                                                                                 
40 See Schwarcz, supra note 12, at 373–74 (suggesting that the financial crisis of 2008 
was due to weaknesses in the financial markets rather than banks specifically). Nevertheless, 
during 2000–2008, the top five executives at Bear Stearns and Lehman pocketed roughly $1.4 
billion and $1 billion, respectively, averaging out to approximately $250 million per executive. 
See Bebchuk supra note 38, at 267–73 (noting that top executives unloaded shares and options 
and therefore were able to cash out much of their equity before the stock price of their firms 
plummeted). 
41 Radhakrishnan Gopalan et al., The Optimal Duration of Executive Compensation: 
Theory and Evidence 2–3 (August 10, 2010) (The Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate 
Governance and Financial Regulation) (unpublished manuscript), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1656603 (“This [finding] is somewhat surprising, given the recent 
criticism that short-termism in executive compensation at banks may have contributed to the 
2007-09 financial crisis.”). 
42 See supra notes 16–17 and accompanying text. 
43 Id. 
44 See supra notes 15-17 and accompanying text. 
45 See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107–204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified at 15 
U.S.C. §§ 7201-66 (2006)) (mandating widespread corporate governance reform in the areas of 
accounting, executive compensation, and mandatory disclosure for public companies). 
46 See, e.g., Richard W. Stevenson & Richard A. Oppel Jr., Fed Chief Blames Corporate 
Greed; House Revises Bill, N.Y. TIMES, July 17, 2002, at A1 (discussing remarks on “a culture 
a corporate culture blighted by ‘infectious greed’” made by then Federal Reserve Board 
Chairman Alan Greenspan following the collapse of Enron); Louis Lavelle, The Best & Worst 
Boards: How the Corporate Scandals Are Sparking a Revolution in Governance, BUSINESS 
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Even if compensation incentives may have only been one relevant 
factor among many contributing to the Financial Crisis, executives 
and compensation committees are nevertheless more likely to 
thoroughly vet the risks and consequences of their compensation 
policies and practices if the SEC requires disclosure of compensation 
risk, as the executives and directors bear potential liability for 
nondisclosure or false disclosures. Accordingly, Part Two considers 
how recent regulatory reform encourages public companies to 
seriously review and consider the scope of their risk-management 
policies and compensation packages, by requiring such companies to 
disclose information about risk-management and compensation-
induced risk taking. 
II. ITEM 402(S): SEC DISCLOSURE OF INCENTIVE-BASED 
COMPENSATION RISK MANAGEMENT 
Undoubtedly, the Financial Crisis and subsequent bailout have cast 
a shadow of uncertainty over current incentive-based compensation 
arrangements in investment banking, mortgage, insurance, and other 
industries.47 Indeed, members of the SEC have bought into the notion 
that executive compensation arrangements influence risk-taking 
behavior; for example, here are the comments of one sitting 
Commissioner: 
How executives are paid influences how they behave. 
Executive behavior reveals itself in how the company 
evaluates risk; in whether the management team is too tepid 
or, by contrast, overconfident in pursuing new growth 
opportunities; in the extent to which innovation is rewarded; 
in the extent to which the corporate culture emphasizes ethics 
and personal responsibility; and in whether the company’s 
controls demand accountability.48 
To that end, over the past decade, the SEC has significantly 
expanded the scope of executive-compensation-practice disclosure.49 
                                                                                                                 
 
WEEK, Oct. 7, 2002, at 104, 114 (describing Enron as the “biggest governance failure in modern 
corporate history”). 
47 See supra Part I. 
48 See, e.g., Troy A. Paredes, Comm’r, SEC, Address at the Transatlantic Corporate 
Governance Dialogue: Corporate Governance and the New Financial Regulation: Complements 
or Substitutes? (Oct. 25, 2010), available at http://sec.gov/news/speech/2010/spch 
102510tap.htm). 
49 See, e.g., SEC Executive Compensation Disclosure, Exchange Act Release No. 33-
8765, 71 Fed. Reg. 78,338 (Dec. 29, 2006) (expanding the scope of compensation, disclosure, 
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For example, SEC rules require most public companies to disclose 
extensive information regarding all aspects of the compensation 
packages awarded to the corporation’s five highest paid executives in 
the annual proxy statement, including, since 2006, a comprehensive 
compensation, disclosure, and analysis (“CD&A”) section.50 
Predictably, the trend towards increased disclosure of compensation-
related and risk-based corporate decisions continued with the recent 
disclosure-enhancement rules.   
A. Rule Making Process for Item 402(s) and Final Release 
To encourage disclosure and candid discussion of these sensitive 
issues, the SEC recently promulgated a set of new disclosure rules 
intended to compel greater disclosure of executive compensation 
arrangements, as they pertain to risk taking and risk management.51 In 
December 2009, the SEC issued final rules on new CD&A guidelines. 
These rules are intended to enhance the laws that govern: (1) 
compensation disclosure; (2) director and nominee disclosure; (3) 
board-leadership and risk-oversight disclosure; (4) compensation 
consultant disclosure; and (5) reporting of voting results on Form 8-
K.52 While “each ‘enhancement’ is important, the first—enhanced 
compensation disclosures—is an explicit recognition of the supposed 
need to address risk-related compensation practices across firms.”53  
This Comment focuses on the amendment requiring reporting 
companies to disclose any compensation policies and practices that 
specifically relate to risk management.54 Specifically, companies are 
instructed as follows: 
                                                                                                                 
 
and analysis disclosures in annual proxy statements). 
50 See id. (“[R]evis[ing] Summary Compensation Table and Director Compensation Table 
disclosure with respect to stock awards and option awards to provide disclosure of the 
compensation cost of awards over the requisite service period.”). 
51 See Proxy Disclosure Enhancements, Exchange Act Release No. 33-9089, 74 Fed. Reg. 
68,334 (Feb. 28, 2010) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 229, 239, 240, 249, 274).  
52 Id.; see also Press Release, SEC, SEC Approves Enhanced Disclosure About Risk, 
Compensation and Corporate Governance (Dec. 16, 2009), available at http://www.sec.gov/ 
news/press/2009/2009-268.htm (“[T]he new rules will improve corporate disclosure regarding 
risk, compensation and corporate governance matters when voting decisions are made.”). 
53 Okatomo & Edwards, supra note 21, at 178 (arguing that current regulatory attempts to 
curb excessive risk taking fail to provide an account of “optimal risk taking”); see also S.E.C. 
Approves Tougher Rules on Executive Pay, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 16, 2009, available at 
http://nytimes.com/2009/12/17/business/17pay.html (discussing how new rules were partly 
intended to remedy “[c]ompany policies that encouraged excessive risk-taking and rewarded 
executives for delivering short-term profits”).  
54 See Regulation S-K Item 402(s), 17 C.F.R. § 229.402(s) (2010). 
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To the extent that risks arising from the registrant’s 
compensation policies and practices for its employees are 
reasonably likely to have a material adverse effect on the 
registrant, discuss the registrant’s policies and practices of 
compensating its employees, including non-executive 
officers, as they relate to risk management practices and risk-
taking incentives.55 
Although this provision has the potential to significantly impact 
incentive-based compensation practices, its practical effect will be 
largely based on how the SEC interprets and enforces the rule. First, a 
review of the rule-making process is necessary to grasp what the SEC 
intended to accomplish by implementing the rule, and in turn, what 
type of information should be disclosed to meet the intended 
objective.  
1. Rule Making History and Intent 
These rules had been anticipated for some time.56 At the onset of 
the Financial Crisis, the SEC acknowledged a need for greater 
transparency in executive compensation practices, “especially with 
regard to activities that materially contribute to a company’s risk 
profile.”57 Concurrently, the SEC perceived a corporate governance 
failure stemming from “compensation policies [that] ha[d] become 
disconnected from long-term company performance because the 
interests of management and some employees, in the form of 
incentive compensation arrangements, and the long-term well-being 
of the company [were] not sufficiently aligned.”58 
The rule, as originally proposed, required disclosure of risks 
arising from compensation policies that may have an adverse effect 
on the company. Notably, the final rule replaces “may” with 
“reasonably likely to,” a higher standard of certainty.59 By making 
                                                                                                                 
55 Id. (emphasis added). 
56 The proposed rules were issued mid-2009. See Proxy Disclosure and Solicitation 
Enhancements, 74 Fed. Reg. 35,076 (proposed July 17, 2009) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 
229, 239, 240, 249, 270 and 274). 
57 Id. 
58 Id. at 35077 (citing FINANCIAL STABILITY FORUM, FSF PRINCIPLES FOR SOUND 
COMPENSATION PRACTICES 1 (2009), http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/publications/r_ 
0904b.pdf). 
59 In response to a number of comments submitted following publication of the proposing 
release, the SEC determined that raising the threshold standard of certainty to reasonably likely 
would lessen the potential for overreaching, and would provide shareholders with disclosure of 
the most meaningful information, rather than an overwhelming and undecipherable information 
dump. See Proxy Disclosure Statements, 74 Fed. Reg. 68,334, 68,336-37 (Dec. 23, 2009) 
(codified at 17 C.F.R. § 229.402(s)) (discussing that broad disclosure requirements could have a 
materially adverse effect on companies).  
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this alteration, the SEC significantly reduced the risk of 
overdisclosure, as “may” is perhaps the broadest possible form of 
probability.  This change parallels the SEC’s prior approach to risk-
based disclosure in Management’s Discussion and Analysis 
(“MD&A”) under Item 303 of Regulation S-K.60 
2. Final Rule Release 
As discussed above, the new disclosure requirements are intended 
to help shareholders better understand and evaluate the leadership of 
public companies.61 Item 402(s) requires a narrative discussion of 
how a company’s overall employee compensation policies create 
incentives that can affect the company’s risk profile and how the 
company manages that risk.62 Additionally, in contrast to the 
traditional disclosure about executive compensation, which focused 
exclusively on senior management, Item 402(s) requires a company to 
address its compensation policies and practices for all employees to 
the extent they create risks that are reasonably likely to have a 
material adverse effect on the company.63 This means, for example, 
that a bank must consider the compensation schemes that, for 
example, might entice a low- or middle-ranking trader to engage in 
the high risk trading epitomized by “rogue traders,” such as Jerome 
Kerviel at Société Générale.64 
To assist companies in executing the arguably onerous task of 
evaluating compensation risk for all employees, the final rule 
includes a non-exclusive list of situations in which compensation 
policies and practices may raise material risks to companies and the 
concomitant requirement to discuss them, as follows: 
 At a business unit of the company that carries a 
significant portion of the company’s risk profile;  
 At a business unit with compensation structured 
significantly differently than other units within the company;  
                                                                                                                 
60 See Disclosure in Management’s Discussion and Analysis About Off-Balance Sheet 
Arrangements and Aggregate Contractual Obligations, Securities Act Release No. 8182, 
Exchange Act Release No. 47,264, 68 Fed. Reg. 5982, at 5984-85 (Feb. 5, 2003) (codified at 17 
C.F.R. pts. 228, 229, 249) (adopting a “reasonably likely” standard for disclosure of perceived 
risks, events or uncertainities in the MD&A context); see also infra notes 77–78 and 
accompanying text. 
61 See Proxy Disclosure Statements, 74 Fed. Reg. at 68,336-37.  
62 See SEC Regulation S-K Item 402(s), 17 C.F.R. § 229.402(s) (2010). 
63 Id. 
64  See, e.g., Nicola Clark, Rogue Trader at Société Générale Gets 3 Years, N.Y. TIMES, 
Oct. 6, 2010, at B1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/10/06/business/global/06bank. 
html?pagewanted=1&sq=societe%20generale&st=Search&scp=2. 
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 At a business unit that is significantly more profitable 
than others within the company; 
 At a business unit where compensation expense is a 
significant percentage of the unit’s revenues; and  
 That very significantly from the overall risk and reward 
structure of the company, such as when bonuses are awarded 
upon accomplishment of a task, while the income and risk to 
the company from the task extend over a significantly longer 
period of time.65 
Item 402(s) specifies that the above list is not exhaustive, however, it 
is a good starting point.66 During its evaluation of compensation risk, 
a company should consider whether any of the company’s business 
units fall within the descriptions in the above list. In any such unit or 
division, the company’s evaluation should analyze the key employees 
or groups of employees. If the company considers these employees in 
addition to the compensation practices relating to executives, the 
company can be confident that its evaluation satisfies Item 402(s) 
requirements.  
B. Scope of Item 402(s) 
1. Determination of Materiality 
As a threshold issue, companies must first determine whether their 
compensation arrangements create risks, and second, whether such 
risks are reasonably likely to have a materially adverse effect on the 
company.67 The general standard of materiality, set forth in TSC 
Industries, Inc. v. Northway, Inc.,68 is whether there is a “substantial 
likelihood that the disclosure of [an] omitted fact would have been 
viewed by the reasonable investor as having significantly altered the 
‘total mix’ of information made available.”69 Further, in Basic Inc. v. 
Levinson,70 the Supreme Court adopted the TSC Industries standard of 
                                                                                                                 
65 Proxy Disclosure Enhancements, 74 Fed. Reg. at 68,337. The SEC indicated that this is 
intended to be a non-exhaustive list, as other situations may arise that warrant disclosure and 
discussion. Id. Further, even in the above-listed scenarios, the SEC believes that a company 
could reasonably conclude that the requisite risk is not present. Id. 
66 Id. 
67 Id. 
68  426 U.S. 438 (1976).  
69 Id. at 449 (holding that “[a]n omitted fact is material if there is a substantial likelihood 
that a reasonable shareholder would consider it important in deciding how to vote”); see also 
SEC Staff Accounting Bulletin No. 99, 64 Fed. Reg. 45150 (Aug. 19, 1999) (stating that 
misstatements that have the effect of increasing management’s compensation may well render 
material a relatively small misstatement of a financial item).   
70  485 U.S. 224 (1988). 
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materiality for the anti-fraud context,71 and applied a 
“probability/magnitude” balancing approach to determine materiality 
in the case of contingent or speculative information or events.72  
The SEC provided additional guidance on the extent to which 
companies must disclose risk-taking compensation incentives through 
recently released comments.73 Specifically, the SEC explained that 
the “reasonably likely” standard parallels the Management’s 
Discussion and Analysis (“MD&A”) disclosure requirements74 
Interestingly, the SEC specifically rejected the Basic 
“probability/magnitude” test general materiality standard when 
interpreting the “reasonably likely” standard in the MD&A context,75 
and instead, applied a two-prong approach to interpretation of the 
“reasonably likely” standard: 
[T]wo assessments management must make where a trend, 
demand, commitment, event or uncertainty is known:  
1. Is the known trend, demand, commitment, event or 
uncertainty likely to come to fruition?  If management 
determines that it is not reasonably likely to occur, no 
disclosure is required.  
2. If management cannot make that determination, it must 
evaluate objectively the consequences of the known trend, 
demand, commitment, event or uncertainty, on the 
assumption that it will come to fruition.  Disclosure is then 
required unless management determines that a material effect 
                                                                                                                 
71  Id. at 232. 
72  Id. at 238–39 (quoting SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 849 (2nd Cir. 
1968)) (holding that where information or events are speculative, such as in the merger 
negotiation context, materiality “‘will depend at any given time upon a balancing of both the 
indicated probability that the event will occur and the anticipated magnitude of the event in light 
of the totality of the company activity’”). 
73 See Proxy Disclosure Enhancements, 74 Fed. Reg. 68,334, 68,337 (Dec. 23, 2009) 
(codified at 17 C.F.R. § 229.402(s)).  
74 Id. at 68,336. For example, the MD&A imposes a forward-looking duty to “[i]dentify 
any known trends or any known demands, commitments, events or uncertainties that will result 
in or that are reasonably likely to result in the registrant’s liquidity increasing or decreasing in 
any material way.” 17 C.F.R. § 229.303(a)(1) (2010) (emphasis added). 
75 See Commission Guidance Regarding Management’s Discussion and Analysis of 
Financial Condition and Results of Operations, 68 Fed. Reg. 75,056, 75,057 n.6 (Dec. 29, 2003) 
(codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 211, 231, 241) (“‘The probability/magnitude test for materiality . . . is 
inapposite to [MD&A] disclosure.’”) (quoting Management’s Discussion and Analysis of 
Financial Condition and Results of Operations; Certain Investment Company Disclosures, 
Securities Act Release No. 6835, Exchange Act Release No. 26,831, 54 Fed. Reg. 22,427, 
22,430 n.27 (May 24, 1989) (codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 211, 231, 241, 271)).  
 1/11/2011 12:04:12 PM 
2011] REGULATION S-K ITEM 402(s) 17 
on the registrant’s financial condition or results of operations 
is not reasonably likely to occur.76 
Accordingly, Item 402(s) requires disclosure of compensation risk 
unless the risk is not reasonably likely to occur and/or the risk is not 
reasonably likely to cause a materially adverse effect. 
Such an approach may seem puzzling to an investor at first glance. 
Intuitively, one would assume that should an incentive-based 
compensation practice tied to risk taking materialize and result in a 
materially adverse effect on the corporation, a shareholder would 
likely assert that had the short-term risk-rewarding compensation 
practice been disclosed, the shareholder would not have invested in 
the corporation, or perhaps would have voted against the 
compensation policy. But in MD&A, and now in Item 402(s), the 
SEC chose the pragmatic approach of “reducing the possibility that 
investors will be overwhelmed by voluminous disclosure of 
insignificant and possibly unnecessarily speculative information.”77 
This formulation follows the approach adopted by the Supreme Court 
in its definitions of materiality, taking into account Judge Friendly’s 
concern with the term “might,” as explained by Justice Marshall in 
the seminal materiality case TSC Industries v. Northway, Inc.: 
We are aware, however, that the disclosure policy 
embodied in the proxy regulations is not without limit. Some 
information is of such dubious significance that insistence on 
its disclosure may accomplish more harm than good. The 
potential liability for a Rule 14a-9 violation can be great 
indeed, and if the standard of materiality is unnecessarily low, 
not only may the corporation and its management be 
subjected to liability for insignificant omissions or 
misstatements, but also management's fear of exposing itself 
to substantial liability may cause it simply to bury the 
shareholders in an avalanche of trivial information—a result 
that is hardly conducive to informed decisionmaking. 
Precisely these dangers are presented, we think, by the 
definition of a material fact adopted by the Court of Appeals 
                                                                                                                 
76  Commission Statement About Management’s Discussion and Analysis of Financial 
Condition and Results of Operations, Securities Act Release No. 8056, Exchange Act Release 
No. 45,321, 67 Fed. Reg. 3746, 3748 (Jan. 25, 2002) (citing Management’s Discussion and 
Analysis of Financial Condition and Results of Operations; Certain Investment Company 
Disclosures, 54 Fed. Reg. at 22,430).  
77  Disclosure in Management’s Discussion and Analysis about Off-Balance Sheet 
Arrangements and Aggregate Contractual Obligations, Securities Act Release No. 8182, 
Exchange Act Release No. 47,264, 68 Fed. Reg. 5982, at 5985 (Feb. 5, 2003) (codified at 17 
C.F.R. pts. 228, 229, 249). 
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in this case—a fact which a reasonable shareholder might 
consider important. We agree with Judge Friendly, speaking 
for the Court of Appeals in Gerstle, that the “might” 
formulation is “too suggestive of mere possibility, however 
unlikely.”78 
Presumably, the “reasonably likely” standard requires a determination 
by the company involving a higher level of certainty that a particular 
compensation incentive actually creates a risk, which is “reasonably 
likely” to occur, and will have a materially adverse effect on the 
company if it does occur.  
Further, the MD&A section sets forth a “knowledge” requirement, 
mandating that the corporation have knowledge of the events and/or 
conditions that are reasonably likely to materially affect some aspect 
of the corporation.79 Thus, the MD&A requires management to assess 
what it has already contemplated as a risk or at least is aware of as a 
trend, event, or uncertainty. Such a knowledge requirement is 
noticeably lacking in Item 402(s); in effect, the SEC is treating all 
compensation as inherently risky, and therefore something that must 
be assessed for possible adverse effect. Accordingly, we can infer that 
corporations have both a duty to first investigate potential risks 
relating to compensation and then to determine whether those 
identified risks rise to “reasonably likely” level.80 Importantly, 
compensation committees must evaluate compensation risk by 
expanding the focus beyond the executive officers to all employees.  
Although there is some risk involved in all corporate activity, the 
financial services industry inherently involves high levels of risk.81 
Arguably, when incentive-based compensation is tied to short-term 
profits, which is in turn dependent on short-term risk taking, there is a 
potential for opportunistic abuse by executives and employees.82 
Whether an accurate portrayal or not, conventional wisdom maintains 
that executives are more likely to focus on short-term profits at the 
expense of potential long-term disaster.83 Accordingly, under many 
circumstances, short-term incentives may well be considered 
                                                                                                                 
78  TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 448–49 (1976) (internal citations and 
quotations omitted). 
79 17 C.F.R. § 229.303(a)(1). 
80 See, e.g., J & R Mktg., SEP v. Gen. Motors Corp., 549 F.3d 384, 392 (6th Cir. 2008) 
(holding that the company must have actual knowledge about the information at issue). 
Requiring disclosure of information that is “knowable” would “extend[] the duty to disclose 
information to include a duty to first investigate and then disclose . . . [which] directly 
contradicts the text of Item 303.” Id. 
81 See supra note 8 and accompanying text. 
82 See supra Part I. 
83 See supra note 13 and accompanying text. 
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“reasonably likely” to have a materially adverse effect on the 
corporation, and failure to disclose such material information may 
result in liability.84 It is clear that both the SEC and Congress 
intended to capture incentive-based short-term risk taking in the 
recent reform: 
First, incentive comp arrangements should provide 
employees with incentives that are appropriately balanced so 
they do not encourage employees to expose their 
organizations to imprudent risk.  
Second, these arrangements should be compatible with 
effective controls and risk management.  
And third, these arrangements should be supported by 
strong corporate governance, including active oversight by 
the organization’s board of directors.85  
When viewed in conjunction with disclosure enhancements requiring 
discussion of internal risk management policies and procedures,86 
disclosure of executive hedging activity,87 and shareholder “say-on-
pay” provisions,88 it is apparent that transparency was a chief concern 
of Congress and the SEC.  
To illustrate how a company might approach evaluation of 
compensation risk and Item 402(s) disclosure, consider the following 
hypothetical. BigPharma is large public company subject to 
Regulation S-K and, therefore, Form 10-K and annual proxy 
disclosure requirements. Research and development (“R&D”) is often 
a large and crucial component of a pharmaceutical company’s future 
profitability, but can also be very expensive and risky.89 Rather than 
                                                                                                                 
84 SEC Regulation S-K Item 402(s), 17 C.F.R. § 229.402(s) (2010). 
85 See, e.g., Executive Compensation Oversight After the Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform 
and Consumer Protection Act: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Financial Services, 111th 
Cong. 4 (2010) (statement of Scott G. Alvarez, General Counsel, Board of Governors of the 
Federal Reserve System) (describing the guidance adopted by the Federal Reserve); see also id. 
60–69 (statement of Meredith Cross, Director of Division of Corporate Finance, Securities 
Exchange Council) (describing new SEC rules addressing executive compensation). 
86 See Proxy Disclosure Enhancements, 74 Fed. Reg. 68,334, 68,344 (Dec. 23, 2009) 
(codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 229, 239, 240, 249, 274) (requiring new disclosures regarding board 
leadership structure and the board’s role in risk oversight). 
87 The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act requires companies 
to disclose to shareholders whether they permit any employee or board member to purchase 
financial instruments that are designed to offset or hedge any decrease in market value of their 
equity-related compensation. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, 
Pub. L. No. 111–203, § 955, 124 Stat. 1376, 1904–05 (2010). 
88 Id. § 971, 124 Stat. at 1915 (requiring a separate resolution at proxy meetings on which 
shareholders will vote to improve the compensation of executives). 
89 See OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, UNITED STATES CONGRESS, 
PHARMACEUTICAL R&D: COSTS, RISKS AND REWARDS (1993) (focusing on the potential 
impacts that changes in federal policy could have on the economic side of pharmaceutical 
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developing new drug therapies internally, BigPharma focuses much 
of its strategic R&D efforts on acquisition of experimental patents 
and small start-up biotech companies with seemingly promising drug 
pipelines.  
Suppose that BigPharma hires an acquisition team of prominent 
scientists and physicians to seek out the most promising new startups 
and patents before they come to market (i.e. before FDA trials have 
begun or during early-stage trials). Suppose further that when 
BigPharma acquires a target company or patent, it pays its R&D 
acquisition team an immediate bonus equal to a percentage of the 
estimated market value that the drug is anticipated to generate over 
the course of its lifecycle (as opposed to, for example, a continuing 
percentage of the value stream payable over time). Given that a 
successful drug therapy in a large market (such as diabetes or blood 
pressure treatments) can generate several billion dollars during its 
product lifecycle,90 the acquisition team bonuses are substantial and 
material to the company in the aggregate. 
In light of Item 402(s), BigPharma’s compensation committee 
must evaluate the R&D acquisition team’s compensation 
arrangement. The R&D team is compensated based on forecasts made 
upon completion of an acquisition, while the income and risk to 
BigPharma that the drug will be approved by the FDA and prove 
successful in the market extend over a significantly longer period of 
time. This is the precise situation found on the SEC’s laundry list of 
enumerated “situations that potentially could trigger discussion.”91 
Accordingly, the R&D acquisition team’s compensation structure 
certainly has the potential to have a materially adverse effect on the 
company. Next, BigPharma must evaluate whether the risk is 
reasonably likely to come to fruition.  If so, or if the likelihood of the 
risk materializing is too uncertain to determine, BigPharma must 
analyze whether the arrangement is reasonably likely to create a 
materially adverse effect. Overall, the test of what constitutes a 
“materially adverse effect” is not a new concept, and will follow the 
same MD&A test that is familiar to reporting companies.92  
                                                                                                                 
 
research and development).  
90 For example, Pfizer’s Lipitor, a blockbuster cholesterol drug, earned $12.88 billion in 
revenue in 2006 alone. See Theresa Agovino, Lipitor to Face Pressure from Insurers, U.S.A. 
TODAY (Mar. 19, 2007), http://www.usatoday.com/news/health/2007-03-19-1475497100_x.htm 
(describing Pfizer’s potential revenue pressures as insurers offer customers generic drugs for 
free upon the expiration of the Lipitor patent). 
91 Proxy Disclosure Enhancements, 74 Fed. Reg. 68,334, 68,337 (Dec. 23, 2009) (codified 
at 17 C.F.R. § 229.402(s)). 
92  See supra notes 68–76 and accompanying text. 
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The question of whether something is “reasonably likely” to occur 
is highly subjective, however, and requires some knowledge about the 
players, industry, human psychology, and the extent of other 
controlling factors, such as the company’s corporate culture and 
internal risk management policies. Some questions a reporting 
company might need to ask include: Are the players risk adverse? 
How do they value their long-term reputation versus near-term 
wealth? What is the likely duration of the employee’s continuing 
work for the company? Does the employee favor short-term gain over 
long-term loyalty to the company? One can imagine that two 
companies could reasonably reach opposite conclusions about the 
“reasonable likelihood” of a material adverse effect stemming from 
similar policies simply based on the risk-taking propensities of the 
individuals involved. 
2. Drafting Item 402(s) Disclosures 
After a company completes the material risk evaluation, its focus 
must shift to drafting the Item 402(s) disclosure. Where no material 
risks exist, a reporting company is technically not required to 
affirmatively state that it has determined that any risks arising from its 
compensation practices are not reasonably likely to have a materially 
adverse effect on the company.93 Yet, during the 2010 proxy season, 
the majority of companies evaluated made an affirmative statement 
that no risks creating a materially adverse effect existed.94 Further, the 
SEC seemed more likely to issue comments to companies that did not 
provide such a voluntary “negating” risk assessment disclosure.95 
This follows what appears to be a fairly normal pattern: negative 
statements are often found in periodic reports apparently either as a 
reminder to the preparer to re-consider the issue in later filings or as 
evidence that they have done so currently. 
If, however, a company determines that disclosure is required, the 
SEC set forth numerous considerations and issues the company may 
need to address: 
 The general design philosophy of the company’s 
compensation policies and practices for employees whose 
behavior would be most affected by the incentives established 
by the policies and practices, as such policies and practices 
                                                                                                                 
93 Proxy Disclosure Enhancements, 74 Fed. Reg. at 68,337. 
94 See infra notes 99–103 and accompanying text. 
95 See infra notes 107–08 and accompanying text. 
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relate to or affect risk taking by those employees on behalf of 
the company, and the manner of their implementation;  
 The company’s risk assessment or incentive 
considerations, if any, in structuring its compensation policies 
and practices or in awarding and paying compensation;  
 How the company’s compensation policies and 
practices relate to the realization of risks resulting from the 
actions of employees in both the short term and the long term, 
such as through policies requiring claw backs or imposing 
holding periods;  
 The company’s policies regarding adjustments to its 
compensation policies and practices to address changes in its 
risk profile;  
 Material adjustments the company has made to its 
compensation policies and practices as a result of changes in 
its risk profile; and  
 The extent to which the company monitors its 
compensation policies and practices to determine whether its 
risk management objectives are being met with respect to 
incentivizing its employees.96  
At first glance, the list appears detailed and onerous. Importantly, 
discussion of these factors is only required if the compensation 
policies and practices create risks that are reasonably likely to have a 
materially adverse effect on the company.97 Additionally, the rule 
requires analysis and discussion about specific facts and 
circumstances—generic boilerplate language is insufficient.98 A 
review of 2010 proxy disclosures reveals how companies initially 
interpreted the scope of the Item 402(s) disclosure requirements. 
a. 2010 Proxy Season Disclosures  
Following the 2010 proxy season—the first year in which most 
companies were required to address the new rule—several 
compensation consulting companies conducted reviews of Item 
402(s) disclosures made during the 2010 proxy season.99 The reviews 
revealed three broad trends: silence, affirmative disclosure, and 
mitigation disclosure. Interestingly, albeit not surprisingly, none of 
                                                                                                                 
96 Proxy Disclosure Enhancements, 74 Fed. Reg. at 68,337. 
97 Id. 
98 Id. For example, a company cannot merely state that compensation risk is necessary to 
attract or retain the most talented employees. Id. 
99 See infra notes 99–105 and accompanying text. 
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the reviewed proxy statements articulated a specific unmitigated 
risk.100 
A report reviewing 215 of the 301 nonfinancial S&P 400 
companies analyzed a number of variables, including: whether 
companies provided risk-assessment disclosure in their proxy filings, 
where the disclosures were located, the employee population covered, 
whether actual results of risk assessment were disclosed, how 
companies viewed risk mitigation, and any changes made by 
companies to address compensation risk.101 The study found that 
although most companies reported a risk assessment (67%), no 
materially adverse risks were disclosed.102 Of those companies that 
did perform a risk assessment, very few described the process used to 
determine that there were no materially adverse risks; rather, “the 
disclosures emphasized how plan design elements have served to 
mitigate risk.”103 Generally, the study reported an overall lack of 
consistency and substance.104  
Another report, which reviewed 223 S&P 500 companies, 
evaluated the disclosures along three measures of compliance: 
process, mitigators, and affirmative statements.105 Again, not 
surprisingly, no materially adverse risks were identified in any of the 
disclosures.106 The study found that 80% of companies discussed the 
process for evaluating risk in their compensation practices; 56% 
described risk-mitigating elements of their compensation practices; 
and 64% of companies included either an implicit or explicit 
affirmative statement about the riskiness of their compensation 
practices.107 
Comparison of these disclosures to the SEC final release and 
stated intent reveal potentially striking disparities. Either companies 
are underreporting the extent to which their compensation policies 
incentivize imprudent risk taking, as conventional wisdom would lead 
one to believe, or as the reality of the case may be, the compensation 
                                                                                                                 
100 For example, Fortune Brands, Inc. stated that they believe that there are no risks arising 
from their compensation policies that are reasonably likely to have a material adverse effect on 
the company. Further, they provide a “mitigation” disclosure outlining how the compensation 
committee, with the assistance of independent compensation consultant, reached its decision. 
FORTUNE BRANDS INC., Definitive Proxy Statement (SCHEDULE 14A) (Mar. 8, 2010). 
101 BUCK CONSULTANTS, STUDY OF 2009 COMPENSATION RISK ASSESSMENT PRACTICES 
AMONG S&P 400 NON-FINANCIAL COMPANIES (2010). 
102 Id. at 5. 
103 Id. 
104 Id. 
105 SEMLER BROSSY CONSULTING GROUP, LLC, COMPENSATION RISK DISCLOSURE–
WHAT ARE COMPANIES DOING?: A STUDY OF S&P 500 COMPANIES (2010).  
106 Id. at 1. 
107 Id. at 2–3. 
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arrangements at the vast majority of public companies simply do not 
encourage imprudent risk-taking behavior to the extent many believe. 
Alternatively, mitigation mechanisms are already in place.  
Further, a challenge to the fundamental notions of transparency 
and information asymmetry emerges in light of these findings. If 
companies do not apply a consistent approach towards risk 
assessment and disclosure, how can investors truly benefit from the 
SEC’s requirement to provide narrative disclosures of risk? Currently, 
the lack of overall consistency within proxy disclosures seems to 
create a confusing web of information. More information is 
meaningless unless it is useful information that can be understood in 
context and compared to other similar information. Given the lack of 
uniformity in current disclosure, it is difficult for an investor to 
rationally compare the compensation risks among companies. 
b. Utilizing Remedial Mechanisms and Deferments to Avoid 
Disclosure of Specific Risks. 
Drafting the disclosure obviously becomes more precarious if 
material risks exist. In that instance, the company would have several 
conceivable options. First, a company could simply disclose the risk. 
While it may be the most straightforward approach, the 2010 proxy 
season illustrates a clear preference to avoid affirmative disclosures of 
material risks.108 In the BigPharma hypothetical scenario, suppose 
BigPharma chose to proceed as planned with the R&D Acquisition 
bonus plan. BigPharma would be required to disclose the facts and 
circumstances of the compensation agreement.109 Its Item 402(s) 
disclosure might read something along these lines: Our compensation 
committee regularly conducts a risk assessment of our compensation 
policies and practices for our executive officers and other employees. 
The committee’s assessment for the current year evaluated the 
company’s R&D acquisition team compensation agreement, which 
guarantees the team a current cash payment equal to 5% of the 
projected lifetime market value of any newly acquired biotech 
company or drug patent attributable to the team’s efforts. The 
committee determined that the team’s compensation arrangement 
involves an inherent level of risk of a materially adverse effect on our 
long-term results by potentially overpaying the team members in the 
event that actual results of the acquisition are materially worse than 
                                                                                                                 
108 See supra notes 99–107 and accompanying text. 
109 See Proxy Disclosure Enhancements, 74 Fed. Reg. 68,334, 68,336–37 (Dec. 23, 2009) 
(codified at 17 C.F.R. § 229.402(s)) (requiring discussion of compensation policies if the risks 
arising from those policies are reasonably likely to have a material effect on a company). 
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those projected. The committee believes that the risk is reasonable, 
however, because all targets are thoroughly vetted, and due diligence 
was conducted and reviewed by our corporate executives, directors, 
and independent consultants prior to acquisition. 
Obviously, while the above disclosure meets the technical 
requirements of Item 402(s), it may not meet the approval of 
shareholders and potential investors.110 Companies in 2010 
unanimously sought to avoid disclosure of specific compensation 
risks that were reasonably likely to create a material risk.111 To avoid 
making a negative disclosure, BigPharma must choose between 
restructuring the compensation agreement and utilizing a remedial 
mechanism to mitigate the risk. BigPharma may wish to avoid 
making a negative disclosure but maintain the underlying “incentive” 
bonus paid to the R&D team. Several remedial mechanisms are 
available. Prospective clawback mechanisms probably provide the 
most liberal check against incentive-based compensation risk.112 In a 
clawback, the employee receives the compensation upfront, but 
assumes the risk of having to repay the amount should later events 
demonstrate he was overpaid.113 The problem with the clawback, of 
course, is that the employee may leave the company, spend the 
money, and refuse to cooperate in repaying. For this reason, the more 
widely utilized mechanisms are forms of deferred compensation, as 
well as forfeiture and recoupment policies, which are more restrictive 
for the individual employee but provide a better check against risk, as 
they align the employee’s compensation with the long-term 
profitability of the company.114  
Of course, any combination of the above mechanisms can be 
utilized to mitigate the particular compensation risk to a point in 
                                                                                                                 
110 See infra Part II(C) for a detailed discussion of how the recent Dodd-Frank legislation 
expands shareholder control and influence over compensation practices. 
111 See supra notes 102, 106 and accompanying text. 
112 For a detailed discussion of prospective clawback agreements, see Cherry & Wong, 
supra note 39, at 388–92 (describing how prospective clawback agreements are becoming more 
commonplace). A review of voluntarily adopted claw-back agreements adopted by various 
publicly traded companies provides a foundation for the drafting of such agreements. See, e.g., 
GENERAL ELECTRIC CO., Definitive Proxy Statement (SCHEDULE 14A) 19 (Mar. 5, 2010) 
(restructuring its clawback provisions and policy to allow the board “discretion to recapture 
compensation for any conduct that is detrimental to the company, rather than just fraudulent or 
intentional misconduct, and that, in all cases, it will seek reimbursement if an executive has 
engaged in fraudulent conduct”); VERIZON COMMC’NS INC., Definitive Proxy Statement 
(SCHEDULE 14A) 44 (Mar. 8, 2010) (stating that the compensation committee adopted a “policy 
that enables the Company to recapture and cancel certain incentive payments received by an 
executive who has engaged in financial misconduct”). 
113 See Cherry & Wong, supra note 39, at 410–11(defining the scope and identifying 
features of clawbacks). 
114 See, e.g., Tung, supra note 13, at 13–35. 
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which the compensation committee feels comfortable concluding that 
the risk is not reasonably likely to have a materially adverse effect. 
Suppose, for instance, that BigPharma’s compensation committee 
chose to revise the R&D acquisition team’s compensation agreement. 
Instead of offering a guaranteed lump-sum bonus upon acquisition of 
a target, BigPharma will offer the employees 25% of the total bonus 
award in cash at the time of acquisition. The bulk of the acquisition 
bonus will then be deferred over a period of time until certain 
benchmarks are met, subject to a forfeiture provision (i.e. the 
employees will receive 25% of the outstanding bonus when the drug 
receives FDA approval, 25% when the drug meets certain sales 
projections, and 25% at retirement). Payment of each deferred 
payment is contingent upon the achievement of the particular goal. 
For instance, if the drug does not receive FDA approval, the 
employees will forfeit the remaining 75% of bonus.  
Aligning the employees’ bonus compensation with the long-term 
success of the underlying drug is likely sufficient to mitigate any 
potential risks.115 Accordingly, BigPharma would not be required to 
disclose details of the team’s compensation agreement. If BigPharma 
chose to disclose, the statement may read as follows: Our 
compensation committee regularly conducts a risk assessment of our 
compensation policies and practices for our executive officers and 
other employees. The committee’s assessment for the current year 
evaluated the company’s R&D acquisition team agreement. Although 
the team is compensated for targeted acquisitions, only a small 
portion of the team’s total bonus compensation is guaranteed and 
short-term in nature. Since the majority of the team’s incentive-based 
bonus compensation is long-term, contingent upon the achievement of 
various benchmarks, and subject to forfeiture, the team’s 
compensation is closely aligned with the company’s risk and income, 
thereby mitigating the extent to which the compensation arrangement 
could produce an adverse effect.  
3. What to Expect in the Future 
The SEC was notably quiet on Item 402(s) disclosures following 
the 2010 proxy season, particularly in light of the relatively sparse 
substantive disclosures provided by most companies. It did, however, 
issue comment letters to a number of companies, which generally fell 
                                                                                                                 
115 See Proxy Disclosure Enhancements, 74 Fed. Reg. at 68,337 (to be codified at 17 
C.F.R. pts. 229, 239, 240, 249, 274) (noting that disclosure will serve to mitigate risks caused 
when companies award task-based bonuses to employees but the company continues to face risk 
from that task for a longer period of time). 
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under one of two categories. Some letters were issued to companies 
that omitted Item 402(s) discussion entirely,116 which seems peculiar 
given that companies are not required to make any disclosure if there 
are no compensation risks.117 Other comment letters were issued to 
companies that made disclosures, but failed to mention the process 
they used to arrive at their conclusions regarding risk.118  
Nevertheless, such results are not surprising. First and foremost, 
the SEC consistently emphasizes the “why” and “how” of a 
company’s decision-making process. If the company determines that 
there are no material risks reasonably likely to have an adverse effect 
on the company, a simple statement that such risks do not exist will 
likely be insufficient. Rather, the SEC is seeking substantive 
discussion exploring why such risks do not exist (for example, did the 
company implement remedial risk-reduction measures in its 
compensation arrangements such as clawbacks, deferrals, etc.), and 
how the company came to its conclusion (for example, does the 
company employ an independent compensation consultant, did the 
board of directors thoroughly vet the various compensation factors 
involved). Likewise, if a company concludes that such risks may or 
do exist but are not material or not reasonably likely to have an 
adverse effect, the deductive process that led to such a conclusion 
should be articulated.  
It should be noted, however, that simply because the SEC has not 
yet provided further clarification regarding the scope of the disclosure 
requirements, does not necessarily mean that it will not in the future. 
In terms of additional guidance and enforcement, the SEC’s handling 
of the MD&A disclosure may serve as an illustration as to how the 
SEC intends to construe and enforce the recent disclosure 
enhancements.  
The current MD&A framework was adopted in 1980, and requires 
a discussion of “liquidity,” “capital resources,” “results of 
operations,” and “other information that the registrant believes to be 
necessary to an understanding of its financial condition, changes in 
financial condition and results of operations.”119 The 1980 
requirements were far more comprehensive than prior iterations, but 
were intentionally broad to encourage meaningful disclosure rather 
than boilerplate discussions.120 Despite the 1980 version’s broad 
                                                                                                                 
116 See BUCK CONSULTING, supra note 101, at 10. 
117 See SEC Regulation S-K Item 402(s), 17 C.F.R. § 229.402(s) (2010) (requiring 
narrative disclosure only if there are compensation risks). 
118 See BUCK CONSULTING, supra note 101, at 10.  
119 Regulation S-K Item 303, 17 C.F.R. 229.303(a) (2010). 
120 Management’s Discussion and Analysis of Financial Condition and Results of 
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scope, the SEC found that the original general language led to 
underreporting, non-compliance, and minimal enforcement.121 Eight 
years later, the SEC embarked on a sweeping review of MD&A 
disclosures, which resulted in hundreds of comment letters, 
amendments, and requests for future compliance.122 In addition, in 
1989 the SEC issued an interpretive guidance release that provided 
significantly more detailed and specific disclosure requirements, 
arguably expanding the scope of MD&A far beyond what was 
originally contemplated by most registrants and commentators.123 
Indeed, the clarity with which MD&A is written today is likely 
largely dependent on this and subsequent formal and informal SEC 
interpretations and staff discussions, rather than the rule as written.  
So too may be true for Item 402(s). 
It is conceivable for the SEC to proceed in a similar fashion with 
respect to Item 402(s). Such a situation is more likely to occur if the 
SEC believes that the rule, as written without more guidance, is not 
compelling the type and depth of disclosure intended. While not 
providing much substantive guidance beyond the final release, the 
SEC has spoken numerous times on their intent in implementing Item 
402(s)—to combat compensation based incentives to engage in 
excessive risk taking.124  
Accordingly, companies should be encouraged to err on the side of 
caution in considering whether to disclose various risk-taking 
incentives. Preferably, companies should seek to establish risk-
management policies and execute agreements with executives to 
prospectively limit the extent to which various incentive-based 
compensation practices may encourage employees to take imprudent 
risks. To avoid the ambiguity and liability issues associated with Item 
402(s), companies should consider utilizing mitigation mechanisms as 
a means to properly comply with the requirements of Item 402(s), 
                                                                                                                 
 
Operations; Certain Investment Company Disclosures, Securities Act Release No. 6835, 54 Fed. 
Reg. 22,427 (May 24, 1989).  
121 Id. at 22,427–28. 
122 Id. 
123 Id. 
124 See Shelley Parratt, Deputy Director, Div. of Corporate Fin., Speech by SEC Staff: 
Executive Compensation Disclosure: Observations on the 2009 Proxy Season and Expectations 
for 2010, Speech Before the Fourth Annual Proxy Disclosure Conference (Nov. 9, 2009), 
available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2009/spch110909sp.htm) (describing how it is the 
SEC’s role to help provide investors with insight into the compensation policies of companies 
so that investors can make informed, risk-based investment decisions); Mary L. Schapiro, 
Chairman, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Speech by SEC Chairman: Statement at SEC Open Meeting 
(July 1, 2009), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2009/spch070109mls.htm 
(describing the need by investors to receive correct information regarding executive 
compensation).  
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while avoiding specific and explicit disclosure of incentive-based 
compensation risks. 
Above all, corporate boards and officers should be diligent in their 
effort to fully and fairly evaluate and disclose risk situations before 
they create actual exposure to the company.  No company wants to be 
the “poster child” for noncompliance, as Caterpillar was for MD&A 
non-disclosure.125 
C. Shareholder Empowerment  
Finally, and perhaps most importantly from a practical perspective, 
the ultimate impact of Item 402(s) may stretch beyond a mere 
disclosure provision, particularly given the potential interplay among 
the new Dodd-Frank provisions. For example, one could easily 
imagine shareholder disapproval in the event a company discloses 
that its compensation practices are reasonably likely to have an 
adverse effect on the company. Suppose, hypothetically, that the 
California Public Employees’ Retirement System (“CalPERS”) owns 
5% of BigPharma’s common stock and relies on RiskMetrics for a 
determination of how to vote its “say-on-pay” vote. Undoubtedly, a 
negative disclosure under Item 402(s) will raise a red flag for 
RiskMetrics, which will likely result in a recommendation for 
CalPERS to reject BigPharma’s proposed compensation packages.126 
The consequences are twofold. First, the votes of other shareholders 
will be affected if they are aware of BigPharma’s “no” vote or have 
access to RiskMetrics’ advice themselves.127 Second, suppose 
BigPharma’s board of directors decides to ignore the negative votes, 
CalPERS among them, and approves Company X’s compensation 
arrangements going into the next year. The board members should be 
willing to forego their Board seats following next year’s proxy vote, 
                                                                                                                 
125 See In re Caterpillar, Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 34-30,532, 51 SEC Docket (CCH) 
147 (March 31, 1992) (issuing a cease-and-desist order for Caterpillar’s failure to disclose 
financial results about its Brazilian subsidiary because there was known future uncertainty 
regarding the subsidiary’s operations and the subsidiary’s current earnings materially affected 
Caterpillar’s reported income). 
126 In its 2011 corporate governance policy update, ISS explicitly states that although 
executive pay and practices are evaluated on a case-by-case basis, its current recommendation if 
a company maintains problematic pay practices is to generally vote against management “say on 
pay” proposals. INSTITUTIONAL S’HOLDER SERS., U.S. CORPORATE GOVERNANCE POLICY: 2011 
UPDATES 16 (2010), available at http://www.issgovernance.com/files/ISS2011USPolicyUpdates 
20101119.pdf. Although “say-on-pay” votes are not votes regarding compensation risk, 
shareholders are nevertheless likely to view compensation practices that create a risk of adverse 
effects on the company as problematic. 
127 See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. 111–203, 
§ 951(d), 124 Stat. 1376, 1900 (2010) (requiring disclosure by institutional investment managers 
on how they voted in shareholder “say-on-pay” votes). 
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as BigPharma has likely adopted a majority-vote requirement for the 
election of directors. In addition, SEC rule provisions now being 
contested in the courts, will, if upheld, provide CalPERS with the 
unqualified right to nominate a new board member to be included on 
the proxy voting cards.128 In short, disgruntled shareholders now have 
more power to directly influence Board behavior—at least in theory. 
Depending on how the SEC construes the scope of disclosure, these 
issues are more likely to arise as companies will be forced to disclose 
more substantive information. The SEC’s precedential approach in 
other areas of disclosure indicates that the scope of Item 402(s) 
disclosure may ultimately be broader than companies now hope.129  
Accordingly, the incentive for compensation committees to 
mitigate or eliminate compensation risk and avoid disclosure extends 
beyond public perception and forced disclosure. Fundamentally, it is 
assumed that the more information is disclosed, the more information 
shareholders can evaluate in making proxy-and-trading decisions and 
potential investors can consider in determining whether to invest.130 
Interestingly, Congress now seems to be shifting its focus beyond 
mere disclosure and transparency to shareholder empowerment and 
policing.131 Instead of “voting with their feet,” shareholders now 
harness greater influence and control over public companies and their 
Boards—at least in theory. Whether any practical effects will result, 
and whether compensation risk disclosure will expand beyond a mere 
nuisance for compensation committees remains to be seen. One thing 
is for certain—compensation risk has been thrust into the spotlight. 
The potential interaction among the various new rules and regulations 
are complex and substantial, and will undoubtedly be developed over 
the coming years. 
                                                                                                                 
128 Id. § 971, 124 Stat. at 1915 (providing shareholders holding greater than 5% of a 
company’s stock with an unqualified board seat nomination to be included on the company’s 
proxy voting cards distributed to shareholders providing that the shareholder has held the stock 
for at least three years and will continue to hold the stock through the next election); see also 
Order Granting Stay In the Matter of the Motion of Business Roundtable and the Chamber of 
Commerce of the United States of America, Securities Act Release No. 9149, Exchange Act 
Release No. 63,031, Investment Company Act Release No. 29, 456, 75 Fed. Reg. 64,641 (Oct. 
4, 2010) (ordering stay of SEC rules implementing § 971 mandates and summarizing pending 
litigation). 
129 See supra notes 119–122 and accompanying text.  
130 See supra notes 2–3, 7 and accompanying text. 
131 See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act § 951, 124 Stat. at 
1899–900 (setting forth shareholder “say-on-pay” provisions); see also id. § 971, 124 Stat. at 
1915 (providing shareholders holding greater than 5% of a company’s stock with an unqualified 
board seat nomination to be included on the company’s proxy voting cards distributed to 
shareholders). 
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III. CONCLUSION 
The precise scope of disclosure required under Item 402(s) will 
likely be shaped in the years to come. Undoubtedly, the evidence is 
conflicting as to whether executives and their employees knowingly 
engaged in excessive risky behavior for short-term economic gain.132 
Yet, pursuant to Item 402(s), companies should prudently evaluate 
and monitor their compensation practices, particularly incentive-
based compensation, to the extent it may encourage or allow for 
employees to engage in adverse risk taking. 
Most importantly, as with any disclosure, companies should be 
honest and forthright in drafting their Item 402(s) disclosures. If any 
compensation risks surface during the compensation committee 
evaluation process, companies should consider use of mitigation 
mechanisms such as deferments or clawbacks as components of a 
well-designed risk management and compensation practice plan, if 
they have not already done so.133 Diligence and full disclosure are 
certainly advisable as these new regulations take effect and their 
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133 See supra Part II.B.2. 
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